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The Implications of a Cyberattack on Your Securities Portfolio: You May Want to Read Your Holdings’ 10-Ks

falling moneySo, you think that a corporate cyberattack has nothing to do with you? If so, think again. Indeed, to the extent you own stock or securities, the value of your holdings could be at risk in the event of a cyberattack. I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again: Cybersecurity is an economic issue. See here.

Take, for example, Intel (INTC). In the “Risks” section of its 2009 10-K, the company disclosed in a tersely worded statement that its networks had been the victims of “sophisticated” attacks. Kudos to Intel for making this disclosure, which predated the October 2011 publication of the SEC Guidance addressing public companies’ cyber risks and exposures (discussed here and elsewhere, including in the March 2012 edition of the Advisen Cyber Journal. Please feel free to contact me for details on how to obtain this must-read issue and subscribe. Advisen has done a masterful job, as it does with all of its publications). As will be discussed in my next post, a significant number of public companies still have not complied with their cyber risk and cyber exposure reporting “obligations” under the SEC Guidance.

As to Intel, the subject 10-K listed several noteworthy risks. The most intriguing stated that “We may be subject to intellectual property theft or misuse, which could result in third-party claims and harm our business and results of operations.” Intel’s disclosure continued that “[w]e regularly face attempts by others to gain unauthorized access through the Internet to our information technology systems by, for example, masquerading as authorized users or surreptitious introduction of software….These attempts, which might be the result of industrial or other espionage, or actions by hackers seeking to harm the company, its products, or end users, are sometimes successful.”

The adverse economic impact of a cyber-related disclosure is not theoretical, either. Indeed, in the immediate wake of the News Corp./News of the World cell phone hacking scandal in mid-2011, News Corp’s market cap reportedly fell by over 15%, valued at approximately $7 billion, in less than a week. Not surprisingly, News Corp was sued shortly thereafter in a series of securities fraud class actions, which remain pending.

While cyber risks and exposures may or may not have an impact on a stock’s trading price, their potential impact can not be ignored. Google (GOOG) is another example. As previously discussed here, Google has been the subject of cyberattacks which it claims were precipitated by the Chinese government. The import of this development can not be understated, as it created tensions between the U.S. and Chinese governments and even made it into Intel’s SEC filing. For private citizens, however, perhaps the greatest implication of the Google cyberintrusions is the arguable effect that they had on Google’s price per share. On January 12, 2010, when the intrusion was publicly disclosed, Google shares fell 1.7% to $590.48. By April 25, 2010 Google’s shares were trading at $544.99, another roughly 8% price drop. Can these losses be directly linked to the breach of Google’s security systems? Put differently, can a possible link be dismissed? That’s for shareholders and others to decide.

So, what does this all mean? At a minimum, it suggests that the economic implications of a cyber event can be wide ranging, from the simple cost of fixing a security gap to a major hit to a brands’ reputation (remember News of the World? After 168 years of tremendous success globally, it ceased publishing on July 10, 2011 as a direct result of the hacking scandal), all the way to claims arising from the theft of consumer’s personal and financial information. Such an intrusion into the systems of retailer T.J. Maxx (TJX) lead TJX to settle with regulators, states, consumers and others and set a settlement/remediation reserve of over $100 million.

In the end, it is clear that just as consumers need to be vigilant about monitoring their personal and financial information to protect themselves from identity theft and the like, investors too must regularly track their holdings to protect their portfolios and assets. As to the companies whose information and systems are at risk, the need for both D&O and cyber insurance is patently obvious, and is as important as the protection of their intellectual property, consumer information and other non-public data. Risk management, information protection and insurance go hand in hand. And we’re here to make sure everyone recognizes the correlation.

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The Coverage Question

We are grateful to the rapidly-growing number of Cyberinquirer readers who continue to submit substantive content for publication. This truly is an industry blog, and we strive to present alternative points of view from all quarters. 

The following article was authored by Gregg A. Rapoport, Esq., and David Lam, CISSP, CPP. Attorney Rapoport has represented policyholders in coverage litigation for over 20 years as part of a broad business litigation practice based in Pasadena, California. Mr. Lam is vice president of the Los Angeles Information Systems Security Association and has over 20 years of experience as an IT and information security professional and author. This article was first published by RIMS, and we appreciate Messrs. Rapoport and Lam offering it for republication here.

Rick Bortnick

As they confront the sobering question of whether their networks and the data they carry are fully secure, today’s “C-level” executives are becoming fluent in once-esoteric information security terms. Many have reached the conclusion that no matter the size of their IT and security budgets, there is no foolproof system for securing the confidentiality, integrity and availability of their data. Company networks remain vulnerable to attacks even if they adhere to industry best practices and run best-of-breed firewalls.

To address these security challenges, companies are relying on their risk managers to evaluate the applicability of existing insurance coverage to data breach incidents, and to assess the value of transferring some of the uncovered financial risk to one of the carriers now offering cyber-risk insurance policies. As the market for these products matures, premiums have come down significantly and policy limits have increased.

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An Insurer’s View: Examining the Rising Costs of Breaches

The following article, written by reknowned London Market underwriter Rick Welsh, was first published in the November 2011 Data Guidance newsletter. A shout out to Rick for passing it on to us for republication.

Rick Bortnick

Today, no company – even with comprehensive privacy policies and practices – can be safe from data breaches. Can companies effectively transfer the risk (and cost) of data breaches by way of insurance? What costs should the companies consider? Almost every reference to the cost of data breaches or ‘cyber crime’ identifies the actual cost of the breach notification as its common currency. In Part One of this analysis, Rick Welsh, Cyber Underwriting Director at ANV, explores this metric’s limitations and the true exposure and cost of data breaches.

The well-regarded Ponemon Institute is constantly measuring the cost of a data breach and is commonly referenced by many to express the rising cost of data breaches. The second annual ‘Cost of Cyber Crime Study’ issued by the Ponemon Institute in August 2011, found that the median annualised cost of cyber crime for the 50 companies in the study was $5.9 million, with a range being between $1.5 million to $36.5 million. The annualised average was up 56% from the previous year’s study.

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And Now, the Maine Event: Mitigation Costs Constitute Damages in Data-Breach Case

Businesses that necessarily require their customers to disclose credit card and personal information, beware.   Just five days ago, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that claims by class action plaintiffs for ”mitigation damages” arising from alleged negligence and breach of contract were viable.  Anderson v. Hannaford Brothers Co., Nos. 10–2384, 10–2450, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 21239 (1st Cir. Oct. 20, 2011). 

In Anderson, the electronic payment processing  system of a national grocery chain, Hannaford Brothers Co., was breached by hackers in 2007. This resulted in the dissemination of as many as 4.2 million credit card and debit card numbers, expiration dates, and security codes.  Hannaford Brothers was not notified of the breach until February 27, 2008 and subsequently contained the breach on March 10, 2008.  A week later, Hannaford released a statement regarding the breach and announced that over 1,800 cases of fraud resulting from the theft already had been reported. 

Following Hannaford’s announcement, several financial institutions immediately cancelled customers’ debit and credit cards.  Some financial institutions, which refrained from immediately canceling the credit card, monitored the accounts for unusual activity, cancelling the cards, in many cases, without notifying the customer.  Customers who asked that their cards be cancelled incurred fees from issuing banks for the replacement cards. 

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Asia-Pacific Cyber Law Risks and Developments

I.                    Introduction

The Internet facilitates the widespread and instantaneous flow of information across international borders.  While the advent of this method of transnational communication has truly created a “global economy,” at the same time, it has engendered problems for companies and their insurers which seek to assess risk and implement information safeguards, particularly in the face of divergent data privacy laws which vary from region to region or may not even exist in certain jurisdictions.  The Asia-Pacific region typifies such a lack of uniformity.  At the same time, the emerging economies in this rapidly growing part of the world have generated promising targets for computer hackers. 

75% of Asia-Pacific enterprises have experienced cyber attacks in the past 12 months.  Perhaps not surprisingly, a 2010 study by Symantec reported that almost half of all Asia-Pacific-based businesses (and 67% in Singapore) ranked cyber risk and information security as their top concern—more so than natural disasters, terrorism, and traditional crime combined.  Cyber attacks and data breaches are on the radar of CEOs and risk managers for good reason: the average cost for a large company to remediate a data breach in Australia increased to nearly $2 million in 2010, which is slightly up from 2009.  See Ponemon Institute/Symantec 2010 Annual Study: Australian Cost of a Data Breach (May 2011).  Notwithstanding the prevalence of such attacks, it is far more likely that a cyber security program is managed as a part of a company’s traditional business risks, with traditional coverages being contorted to cover various components of cyber risk (i.e. property loss, liability to third-parties, business interruption, etc.), rather than by way of a dedicated cyber-specific insurance program.  Still, in light of recent developments, it is virtually certain that companies soon will begin looking to transfer such risk via more efficient and targeted technology insurance forms and policies.   

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Credit Card Hackers’ Favorite Target…Hotels.

We’ve all heard the story of the clerk at the local gas station who was double-swiping credit cards in order to make fraudulent copies. Online banking, restaurants, clothing retailers…every industry is potentially a target. Yet the industry that was the subject of more credit card thefts than any other sector in 2009?  Hotels.

To the point, SpiderLabs (an affiliate of Trustwave, a data-security consulting firm) has published a study which reports that 38% of the credit card hacking events in 2009 involved the hospitality industry.  Over one-third of all thefts of credit card numbers occurred at hotels. Much to my surprise, given the wealth of reporting on the subject, the financial services industry lagged well behind at a comparatively minor 19%. Retail followed at 14.2% while restaurants and bars were fourth at 13%.

I guess I shouldn’t have been surprised, though, as my own credit card number was stolen several years back while i was staying at a business travelers’ hotel in New York City. I had gone to the City for a Cinco de Mayo event sponsored by a major international insurer. Several days later, I received a call from my credit card company asking if I had bought gasoline on Long Island or a $5000 television at a big box retailer. While I do buy gasoline, I hadn’t been on Long Island. And while I certainly would have loved a $5000 television (or, for economy’s sake, something less pricey), I hadn’t bought that either. The conclusion was simple: my credit card number had been stolen when I used it at the New York hotel.

So, why hotels? According to security analysts, they’re generally easy targets. The large chain hotels may employ sophisticated security technology or other protections. Or they may not. In either case, how about smaller or private owned, non-chain hotels? The next time you check into a hotel, ask what security methods they use to protect credit card information. You probably won’t like the answer. The credit card number that you provide at check-in may sit in a folder or a file maintained right at the front desk. Who would prevent someone from simply lifting the file? Especially in the middle of the night. The single desk clerk on overnight duty?

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Wake Up and Smell the Threats: Two Recent Examples of Why Municipalities Need Cyber Insurance

Odd as it may seem to those of us who live and breathe cyber, tech and privacy insurance, I have heard anecdotally of municipal authorities who profess that their cities and towns do not need to incur the expense of buying these products. “Why do we need them? We don’t operate on the internet,” they reportedly have said.

Well, my response is “why don’t you think you need them?” Do you maintain a bank account? Do you store personally identifiable information about private citizens, whether in your property records, police files, tax databases or otherwise? Are your employees able to access your municipality’s computer systems remotely? Is it really possible that every single piece of information you maintain is recorded on paper and nothing is stored on a mainframe, whether located on- or off-site? Come on. Its 2010. That’s virtually impossible, isn’t it? Haven’t you read my December 23, 2009 post No One is Immune. Even Government Entities Need Cyber/Tech Insurance?

Since that posting, additional municipalities have suffered cyber attacks and been the subject of cyber lawsuits.

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Online Banking and “Reasonable Security” Under the Law: Breaking New Ground?

j0300523With the report of another data security-related lawsuit involving online banking (another 2009 lawsuit referenced here involved an alleged loss of over $500,000), and a recent victory for a plaintiff on a summary judgment motion in a similar online banking data security breach case, the question arises whether online banking breaches will yield some substantive case law on the issue of “reasonable” security procedures as a matter of law. 

Ironically, this question may be answered by reference to a 20 year old model code (UCC 4A) originally drafted to address technological advances from that era. This post explores two complaints recently filed against banks for online banking  (Patco Construction Co. v. People’s United Bank (“PATCO”) and JM Test Systems, Inc. v. Capital One Bank (“JMT”)) and a court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment in similar lawsuit (Shames-Yeakel v. Citizens Bank Memo and Memo Order on Motion for Summary Judgment – “Shames-Yeakel” case).  In short, since the Shames-Yeakel case proceeded past the “damages” pleading phase, it (and possibly these other online breach suits) reveals how some courts view security “standards” and approach the question of whether a company has achieved “reasonable security.”  I also believe they demonstrate the difficulty defendants face if they have to defend their security measures in a litigation context after a security breach.

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